Statutory Construction: Maryland State Police Ordered To Obey Agency's Own Regulation
In Zeigler v. Maryland St4te Police, I the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, applying principles of statutory construction, ordered the Maryland State Police to follow the agency's own regulation regarding the appointment of disciplinary hearing boards. At the same time, Judge Edward A. DeW aters, Jr., resolved an issue of jurisdiction in favor of the plaintiff, resolved issues of severance and attorney's fees in favor of the defendant, and provided some guidance on a constitutional issue based on due process.
FACTS
The plaintiff, First Sergeant John M. Zeigler, assigned to the Maryland State Police Academy, was administratively charged with knowingly submitting a false report,2 endorsing an incomplete report,3 interfering with cases assigned to other officers,· and neglecting duty by failing to take appropriate action. 5 All charges were based on allegedly concealing information relating to a sexual relationship between another member of the academy staff and a recruit. The State Police also charged a captain with three violations and a first lieutenant with two violations.
The permanent chair of the disciplinary hearing board issued Special Order 01-87-260, which provided, in pertinent part, the following:
This board consists of five members who will hear the entire case against all three defendants and participate in the By Professor Byron L. Warnken decision making process pertaining to motions, evidence, etc. However, the decision on verdict and penalty on each defendant will be decided on Zeigler filed a motion to have the three cases tried separately, each before a separate three-member hearing board. The motion was denied by the chair of the five-member hearing board. Zeigler then filed, pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBOR), 6 an application for a show cause order 7 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. An accompanying memorandum of law made two arguments, one statutory and one constitutional.
The essence of the statutory construction argument was as follows: The Superintendent of the Maryland State Police, pursuant to a delegation of authority from the legislature, promulgated an administrative regulation mandating that the permanent hearing board chair shall appoint a three-member hearing board. The only discretion provided by the regulation is whether the permanent chair will serve on a given board. Nonetheless, the permanent chair appointed a five-member hearing board in this case. The failure of the State Police to comply with its own mandatory regulation renders invalid any action taken by the improperly constituted board.
The essense of the constitutional argument was as follows: Administrative agency due process is determined by balancing (1) the private interest affected by official action, (2) the risk of depriving that interest through the procedures used and the availability of remedial procedures, and (3) the public burden in affording the private remedy. In this case, the procedure would make a fair hearing almost impossible. All five members of the hearing board, simultaneously hearing three separate cases, would collectively make all legal rulings in the three cases. Then, three three-member sub-boards, with two members common to all su'b-boards, would resolve the issue of guilt, and, in the event of a guilty finding, recommend punishment. Every finder of fact sub-board would be tainted by (1) two original participants then removed, (2) two finders of fact simultaneously serving on two other boards, (3) one finder of fact not serving on two other boards but who has heard the two other cases for which he was not on the board, and (4) two finders
of fact in the second and third cases influenced by knowledge of their verdicts in whichever case was previously decided. The readily available remedy, with virtually no burden on the State Police, would be to appoint a separate three-member hearing board for each of three separate hearings.
JURISDICTION
The State Police argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because Zeigler (1) failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and (2) failed to allege a violation of the LEOBOR. Zeigler responded by argu-. ing that the circuit court obtained jurisdiction under the "show cause" provision of the LEOBOR, which provides:
Any law enforcement officer who is denied any right afforded by this subtitle may apply at any time prior to the commencement of the hearing before the hearing board, ... to the circuit court of the county V?here he is regularly employed for an order direaing the law enforcement agency to show cause why the right should not be afforded. its own regulations. The Commission appealed, alleging a lack of jurisdiction because section 734 does not authorize the circuit court to terminate an LEOBOR proceeding. In rejecting this argument, the court of special appeals found that section 734 was designed to enable the circuit court to provide broad judicial equitable relief. "It is a very special provision, allowing resort to the court 'prior to the commencement of the hearing before the hearing board.' The purpose of that provision obviously is ... to assure that the police agency will do what the law requires." 22 The court held that the circuit court has wide-ranging authority under section 734 to fashion an appropriate remedy, even to the point of terminating a LEOBOR hearing, and such remedy may be invoked in response to the agency's violation of its own rules.
Judge DeWaters ruled that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County had jurisdiction in Zeigler v. Maryland State Police.
STATUrORY CONSTRUCTION
The LEOBOR provides that a disciplinary hearing "shall be conducted by a hearing board."2J However, the legislature did not set forth in the "hearing" seaion (seaion 730) any size or composition requirements for hearing boards other than the implicit incorporation of the definitional· section. The definitional section (section 727 (d) (1» defers the hearing board decision to the administrative agency, subject to a minimum size requirement of three and a composition requirement of at least one member of equal rank to the accused. 24 The legislature has otherwise delegated the hearing board size and composition decision to the Superintendent of State Police.25
Pursuant to this delegation, the Superintendent promulgated the administrative rules and regulations contained in the Maryland State Police Administrative Manual. Chapter 5, section V, subsection 3-2b provides in pertinent part as follows:
The permanent chairman of the hearing board shall, with the Superintendent's authority, appoint ... a threeman[26] board which shall consist of at least one commissioned officer and one member of a rank equal to that of the accused. The permanent chairman, in his discretion, may serve as a sitting member of any such board and in those cases when he chooses not to sit, one of the appointed commissioned officers shall be designated as the board chairman .... 27
Thus, under subsection 3-2b, as to hearing board size and composition, "[t]he permanent chairman of the hearing board shall ... appoint ... a three-man board which shall consist of at least one commissioned officer and one member of a rank equal to that of the accused."28
Administrative regulations have the same force of law as the enabling legislation authorizing the agency to promulgate. 29 As the federal district court for Maryland stated, "once an administrative agency has promulgated a regulation, even in instances where it is not required to do so, that administrative agency is bound to follow its regulation. This is particularly true where the regulation uses unambiguous, mandatory language."JO Quoting the Supreme Court's decision in United St4tes ex reL Accardi v. Shaughnessy, J 1 the court of special appeals stated, in Williams v. j,[cHugh,J2 that "'[a]n agency of the government must scrupulously observe rules, regulations, or procedures which it has established. When it fails to do so, its action cannot stand and courts will strike it down.' "33 In Vitarelli t'J. Senton, 34 the Supreme Court struck down the adverse personnel action of a federal agency because it failed to follow its own regulation. Justice Harlan held that "the Secretary ... was bound by the regulations which he himself had promulgated for dealing with such cases, even though without such regulation he could have discharged petitioner summarily." 35 In interpreting administrative regulations, the Court of Appeals of Maryland employs the same principles of construction that are used to determine the meaning of statutes. 36 "Whenever the word 'shall' is used it is mandatory. Why else would this word be Used?"37 The term "shall" establishes an imperative obligation upon the agency and forecloses its exercise of discretion. 38 Such a regulation creates a mandatory limitation on the agency, prohibiting action to the contrary.39 This is so even when the reviewing court believes that the mandatory language is unwise or its impact is harsh. 40 Assuming arguendo that the State Police could convince the court that subsection 3-2b's double use of the term "shall" in the first sentence does not automatically make the regulation mandatory, any doubt must be eliminated by the subsection's striking change of expression from "shall" to "may."41 Although the first sentence of subsection 3-2b provides that the permanent chair "shall" appoint a three-member board and "shall" have at least one commissioned officer and one member of the defendant's rank, the second sentence provides as follows: "The permanent chairman, in his discretion, may serve as a sitting member of any such board and in those cases when he chooses not to sit, one of the appointed commissioned officers shall be designated as the board chairman."42 The leading treatise on starutory construction includes the following:
Where both mandatory and directory verbs are used in the same starute, or in the same section, paragraph, or sentence of a statute, it is a fair inference that the legislature realized the difference in meaning, and intended that the verbs used should carry with them their ordinary meanings.
This is especially true where «shall" and «may" are used in close juxtaposition
under circumstances that would indicate that a different treatment is intended for the predicates following them. 43 Not only are "shall" and "may" juxtaposed in subsection 3-2b, the only time that "may" is used, it is accompanied by the words "in his discretion," whereas whenever "shall" is used, the accompanying extension of discretion is conspicuous by its absence. A maxim of statutory construction is expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of others. This maxim is most applicable when the drafter included in one place that which was omitted in another, on the theory that if the drafter wished to include, the drafter would have done so, and the failure to include, particularly after inclusion in the same section, will never be deemed inadvertent. 44 Once determined to be a mandatory regulation, any doubt that the mandate is for a board of three members -not more and not less -must be resolved by again applying the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Subsection 3-2b's manda-"A maxim of statutory construction is expressio unius est exclusio alterius" tory requirements for board size and composition are as follows: "The permanent chairman of the hearing board shall. .. appoint ... a three-man board that shall consist of at least one commissioned officer and one member of a rank equal to that of the accused."45 When the Superintendent intended to give the permanent chair the option to select a given number or more than that number, he provided "at least X." However, when he intended only "X," the phrase "at least" is conspicuous by its absence. Thus, the size of the hearing board shall be three. 46 Zeigler argued that resolving the interpretation of subsection 3-2b could not be more straightforward. The first sentence places a mandate upon the permanent hearing board chair to appoint a threemember hearing board. The language is plain on its face. The result is the same, whether reached by examining the mandatory language of the first sentence standing alone or by examining the first sentence by way of contrast to the permissive language in the second sentence.
The State Police countered with its own statutory construction argument. Chapter 5, section V, subsection 3-0 of the Maryland State Police Administrative Manual provides as follows:
The rules and regulations in this subsection define policy for the imposition of discipline within the Agency. These rules and regulations are guides for handling disciplinary actions and generally should be followed. In unusual situations not covered by these rules and regulations, or where strict adherence to these rules would work an injustice, deviations from the rules and regulations are permitted.
The hearing board chairman and the other members of the board should be flexible and should not apply these rules, regulations and rules of evidence mechanically Y
The State Police argued that subsection 3-0 demonstrated the Superintendent's intent to make subsection 3-2b merely directory. "These rules and regulations are guides . .. The hearing board ... should be flexible and should not apply these rules mechanically."48 Moreover, the regulation specifically provides for "deviations" when encountering "situations not covered by these rules" or when the rules "would work an injustice."49 The State Police took the position that this case fell within both exceptions: (1) it was a complex case with three defendants and thus a situation not covered by the rules; (2) with three co-defendants allegedly acting in concert, the permanent chair could have concluded that the interests of justice would be best served by a combined trial heard by five members.
Zeigler argued that his case did not come within either exception. First, the rules expressly cover every case on the issue of board size, i.e., "shall. .. appoint ... a three-man board .... "50 Second, the exception to avoid injustice could only have been intended to inure solely to the benefit of the officer, not the agency. Judge DeWaters ruled that subsection 3-2b mandated a three-member board and that nothing in subsection 3-0 undermined that mandate in this case.
DUE PROCESS OF lAW
Having resolved the case on statutory construction grounds, the court had no need to rule on the constitutional issue. Nonetheless, the court addressed due process briefly.
Zeigler had requested the court to order three three-person boards. Although the court ordered a three-person board, it to-The Law Forum/ J8.3 ---------------------------------- 
this could best be ruled on by the hearing board, using the same considerations that a court uses in granting or denying severance to criminal defendants. However, he recognized the strength of the due process argument and stated: "I think. the Board has to be extremely careful in making [the severance] decision ... , because if there is any kind of conflict, anything that will work any injustice resulting of him being tried with one or two of the others, then it's going to get here on appeal[51] and be sent back for an independent hearing because of that conflict ... "52
In Mathews 'tI. Eldridge,53 the Supreme Court enunciated a three-part balancing test for ascertaining whether an administrative agency has satisfied the requirements of due process. The Court stated:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the preparation involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.
S4
This test involves balancing costs and benefits to determine what kind of hearing due process requires. 55 The greater the potential harm, the heavier the burden on the administrative agency to provide a procedurally fairer hearing. Similarly, the smaller the burden on the agency, the less need for potential harm before requiring the agency to accommodate.
Zeigler argued that the special order established a hearing procedure that (1) had a high degree of risk of unfairness in the fact finding process, (2) had an appearance of unfairness in the fact finding process, and (3) violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).56 Moreover, he argued that the administrative burden imposed on the State Police to eliminate these three problems and provide due process was de minimus. An examination of each of the three parts of the Supreme Court's test resulted in the following:
(1) The private interest affected by the official action.
A non-probationary public employee has a constitutionally protected property interest requiring due process of law. 57 The Supreme Court stated that police officers "are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights .... "58 In Nichols 'tI. Baltimore Police Department, 59 the court of special appeals described the legislative intent of the LEOBOR as follows: "The purpose of the LEOBOR is to guarantee to those law-enforcement officers embraced therein procedural safeguards during investigation and hearing of matters concerned with disciplinary action against the officer.... In enacting the LEOBOR, the Legislature vested in lawenforcement officers certain 'rights' not available to the general public."60 (2) The risk of deprivation through the procedures used and the probable value of additional or substitute procedureal safeguards.
The special order established a fivemember hearing board to hear simultaneously three separate cases, involving different charges, against three different defendants. Moreover, the order provided for three separate, yet greatly overlapping, trier of fact panels to simultaneously hear three cases. Multiple triers of fact for simultaneously tried defendants is highly disfavored.
In Scarborough 'tI. State,61 two defendants were tried jointly, with a separate jury empaneled to hear each case. Although finding no reversible error in that case, UThe purpose of the LEOBOR is to guarantee . .. procedural safeguards . .. " nevertheless, the court stated that such a procedure has too many risks of prejudice to a fair trial, concluding that "we join the other courts in strongly condemning the use of dual juries."62 This condemnation has been implicitly extended to any jointly tried defendants having different triers of fact. In Nair 'tI. State,63 the court of special appeals relied upon Scarborough to "strongly disapprove of the practice of conducting joint and simultaneous trials of co-defendants" when one has the court as trier of fact and one has a jury. 64 Zeigler argued that his case presented a procedure considerably worse than that in Scarborough in two ways. First, in his case, the triers of fact also would be the triers of law, i.e., the court. By the very nature of the process, the five board members would commingle their thoughts about the case as it progressed. The special order provided that the "five members ... will hear the entire case against all three defendants and participate in the decision making process pertaining to motions, evidence, etc."
Second, not only were the board members intended to commingle their thoughts while serving as the triers of law, they were intended to commingle their thoughts while serving as triers of fact. In Scarborough, no finder of fact ever deliberated on the merits of the case with a finder of fact from the other panel. In Zeigler's case, on the other hand, every finder of fact would always deliberate with a finder of fact who served on another defendant's panel. Moreover, in this case, the prosecution was asserting that there was one cover-up with complicity among three officers. Consequently, there would be a subtle, yet strong, pressure to render consistent verdicts. Upon deliberation on the cases of whichever officers were resolved second and third, two of the three members of the board would deliberate knowing the verdict in the preceding cases, having just rendered them.
Both the "judge of law versus judge of fact" problem and the "judge of fact in multiple cases" problem would be exacerbated in Zeigler's case by the fact that the members of the board would be lay personnel. Although a judge can be expected to fulfill these roles simultaneously, differentiating and excluding mentally, as necessary, a non-judge cannot be expected to accomplish this task. In short, the hearing board procedure made a fair hearing unrealistic, if not almost impossible. 6S It is true that Scarborough was a criminal case and that Zeigler is an administrative adjudicatory hearing. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that because an administrative agency does not follow rules as strict as the judiciary, the need to measure the adjudicatory proceedings against the requirements of due process is even greater. In Ohio Bell Telephone Co. ' Regulatory commissions have been invested with broad police powers within the sphere of duty assigned to them by law. Even in quasi-judicial proceedings their informed and expert judgment exacts and receives a proper deference from courts when it has been reached with due submission to constitutional restraints. Indeed, much that they do within the realm of administrative discretion is exempt from supervision if those restraints have been obeyed. All the more insistent is the need, when power has been bestowed so freely, that the "inexorable safeguard" of a fair and open hearing be maintained in its integrity. The right to such a hearing is one of "the rudiments of fair play" assured to every litigant by the fourteenth amendment as a minimal requirement. There can be no compromise on the footing of convenience or expediency or because of a natural desire to be rid of harassing delay, when that minimal requirement has been neglected or ignored. 67
The Court has also stated that whenever the administrative agency's action is adjudicatory, "it is imperative [to] use the procedures which have been associated with the judicial process."68 Due process is not only concerned with the risk of unfairness but also the appearance of unfairness. In Marshall v. ferrieo, Inc.,69 the Supreme Court stated that the "Due Process Clause ... helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness ... "70 In The administrative tribunals which perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions must be as above suspicion and reproach as courts themselves. When the circumstances are such that the conduct of one member of a tribunal may have infected the independent decision making process of others on the tribunal, the potential exists for the weakening of public confidence in the operation of the agency, and actions taken by boards, commissions, tribunals or agencies under such a cloud must disappear .... A petitioner or litigant is entitled to a decision arrived at by the separate members of the body uncommitteed, unallied, and unfettered at the commencement of their deliberations. 71 Zeigler argued that the risks that were soundly denounced in Scarborough were so greatly multiplied in his case as to unconstitutionally deprive him of due process of law, particularly when examining hearing and that of deciding (or recommending decision on) the merits. In Zeigler's case, the special order assigned five members to conduct the hearing under subsection (b) (1) but only three members to render a decision on the merits under subsection (b) (2). Any procedure in which one number of hearing officers conducts the hearing and a different number decides the merits of the case can easily distort the "majority rule" decision making process. 77 Moreover, section 10-213(a) (1) of the APA provides that "an individual who is not authorized to participate in the decision making process of a contested case may not communicate ex parte with an individual who is involved in the process with regard to any issue of law or fact in the contested case."78 In this case, two of the five hearing board members were "not authorized to participate in the decision making process" as to the merits of each of the three cases, yet these two members were instructed by the special order to "communicate ex parte with [the three inindividuals who were] involved in the process with regard to [motions, evidence, etc.] ." This violation would invalidate the proceeding,79 ( 3) The fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedureal requirements would entail for the governmental agency.
The administrative burden in constituting three separate three-member hearingboards is de minimus, both in the abstract and when weighed against the harm in the Zeigler case. The court in Scarborough recognized that the potential problems caused by a multiple fact finder scenario greatly outweigh any administrative ease that such a procedure may afford. The court stated that "appropriate safeguards necessary to protect the rights of defendants in such a trial would be more time consuming than if separate trials were ordered."80 In H;Yt v. Police Commissioner,81 the Baltimore City Police Department, following the 1974 police strike that involved 901 officers, conducted disciplinary hearings against 130 officers. A separate hearing board was constituted for each officer. Certainly, the formation of two additional three-member hearing boards would be a small administrative price to pay to ensure due process of law.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
In Gardner v. Broderick,82 the Supreme Court prohibited placing a chilling effect on the constitutional rights of law enforcement officers. Section 733 of the LEOBOR prohibits creating a chilling effect on LEOBOR rights. 83
Zeigler asked the court to award reasonable attorney's fees, arguing that without such an award there was an economic chilling effect upon his ability to even seek that to which he was entitled. He noted that the judicial relief sought in this case under the show cause provision was requested administratively in writing seven months earlier. Law enforcement agencies are represented by government-employed attorneys. Consequently, the cost of litigation receives relatively little consideration by the agency. Zeigler argued that even if he prevailed on the merits, he would still be penalized an amount equal to the cost of attorney's fees. Only by an award of attorney's fees could the court place him in the position of being afforded his rights without being penalized for their assertion.
In /18.3 --------------------------------- (emphasis added). 46 Although not at issue in the case, there is ambiguity in the regulation as to whether "at least" modified "one commissioned officer" or "one commissioned officer and one member of a rank equal to that of the accused. 52 Record at 1-4 to 1-5. It appears highly unlikely that the State Police will consolidate these cases.
Even though not ordered to do so, the agency will probably sever the cases because of the combined effect of (1) Judge DeWaters' ruling, require "one member of a rank equal to that of the accused." In light of the ranks of the defendants, a consolidated board must be composed of one captain, one first lieutenant, and one first sergeant. Third, the State Police proffered to the court that it was the agency's policy never to permit a disciplinary hearing in which the guilt and punishment of an officer would be decided by an officer of lesser rank. A consolidated hearing board would violate this policy with regard to two of the three defendants. Fourth, as Judge (continued on page 19) than having the U.c.c. govern check processing and collection by electronic fund transfers, perhaps a better alternative would be the establishment of such a system by contract as designed by the parties. At present, the relationship between the bank and its customers under the Uni- 
